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THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE AND THE JUVENILE SOLDIER DILEMMA
Joshua A. Romero∗
I.

Introduction

¶ 1 In the aftermath of a ten-year civil war, the country of Sierra Leone is undergoing
a lengthy process of recuperation and stabilization. During the decade-long war,
thousands of innocent Sierra Leoneans endured extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, and
abduction at the hands of two warring factions: the Sierra Leone Government and the
Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”). Researchers estimate that at least five-thousand
juvenile combatants actively participated in the war.1 While many children were
conscripted into combat, a significant segment of juvenile soldiers voluntarily
participated in the brutalities.2
¶ 2 At the conclusion of the war in 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone and the

United Nations jointly established the Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute those
“persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law . . ..”3 Despite this strict statutory directive,
juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen determined to be guilty of committing
heinous war crimes are not subject to imprisonment.4 Instead, juvenile criminals will be
“sentenced” to a truth and reconciliation mechanism, where—regardless of culpability—
they are ultimately released back into the very communities they once tortured.5
¶ 3 Punishment of juvenile soldiers challenges both the rehabilitative assumptions

of truth and reconciliation mechanisms and the propriety of informal, nonpunitive, and
relatively short-term social control.6 In a time of widespread exploitation of children, the
Special Court is in a unique position to establish a precedential framework for future ad
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1
See Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers, 9 No. 3 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 18 (2002) (also noting that some estimates conclude that as many as 10,000 child soldiers
fought in the war).
2
See AMNESTY INT’L U.K., IN THE FIRING LINE—WAR AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 60, 61 (1999) (stating that
children’s negative experiences with governmental armed forces was the predominant factor in the
children’s decision to volunteer to fight).
3
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2002), available at
http://specialcourt.org/documents/index1.html. (“Court statute”).
4
Id. at art. 7(2).
5
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html. (“Lome Accords”)
(establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone in which perpetrators voluntarily
disclose their war crimes to the commission without facing punishment).
6
See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).

2

hoc tribunals addressing juvenile combatant issues.7 The Court’s current policy towards
juvenile punishment makes impossible the attainment of just results and neglects to
effectuate fundamental notions of deterrence8 and retribution.9 The current rehabilitative
approach is laudable, but from a real politik perspective, the Sierra Leoneans’ demand for
retributive punishment highlights the dire need for satisfactory sanctions vis-à-vis
culpable combatants. In the absence of such punishments, Sierra Leone will remain
unstable and the rule of law illusory.
¶ 4 The premise of this article is rather simple: The protection of human rights is a

socially valuable and necessary good; as such, human rights violators must face adequate
punishment when appropriate. Punishment must be rendered upon juvenile combatants
who willingly desecrated human rights in Sierra Leone. The proposition that child
soldiers were the first victims of human rights violations is a non-sequitor since this
article advocates only that child soldiers who voluntarily joined a militia and voluntarily
committed war crimes be susceptible to punishment. Ergo, in situations in which the
child soldier was conscripted into warfare, punishment is proper only upon the
conscriptor. When, however, the most culpable juveniles face no bona fide punishment,
the decade-long war merely serves as a training ground to lead future rebellious revolts as
skilled and undeterred leaders.
¶ 5 This article addresses the structural shortcomings of the current Court scheme and
offers an alternative adjudicatory regime for juvenile soldier matters. Section I outlines
the decade-long civil war and the futile peace agreements. Section II explores the nuances
of the Court-enabling statute and the rationale underpinning the expansive statutory
punishment-exclusion for juveniles. Section III evaluates contemporary proposals for
adjudicating child soldier matters and discusses why these proposals insufficiently
address the debacle. Section IV offers an alternative organizational framework for the
tribunal which maximizes deterrence and retribution, and establishes, inter alia, stability
and the rule of law. The conclusion is that in order to resolve the civil unrest in Sierra
Leone, the Court must permit discretionary imprisonment of the most culpable juvenile
combatants, while remaining cognizant of mitigating factors such as age and immaturity.

7

The subject of child soldiers is of global consequence; children have taken-up arms in war for centuries.
See Dominique Marshall, The Construction of Children as an Object of International Relations: The
Declarations of Children’s Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League of Nations, 1900-1924, 7
INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 103, 133-34, n. 149 (1999) (noting that historically the French viewed children as
heroic soldiers). Vicious conflicts involving child combatants are on-going and widespread with over
300,000 children, girls and boys, taking part in hostilities in over thirty countries. Olara A. Otunnu, Special
Representative to the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, at http://www.un.org/specialrep/children-armed-conflict/ffaq.htm.
8
Under deterrence theory, “punishing criminals is morally permissible because it both deters the punished
criminals from further offenses (special deterrence) and deters other people from committing crimes
(general deterrence).” David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1623, 1626
(1992).
9
Retributive theory posits that “punishment is just when it is deserved, and it is deserved by the
commission of an offense. The offense committed is the sole ground of the state’s right and duty to punish.
[J]ustice in these matters is to treat offenders according to their deserts, to give them what they deserve, not
more, not less.” I. PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 147-48 (1989).
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II.

Background
A.

The Civil War in Sierra Leone

¶ 6 The Sierra Leonean civil war began in March 1991 amidst political upheaval over

a multi-party democratic system of governance. Revolutionary United Front forces,
influenced by local discontent and regional instability, attempted to overthrow the
Government and exercise control over the country and its supreme economic resource—
the diamond mines.10 Some commentators have intimated that the true motivation for
RUF forces was continued profit from illegal diamond trade coupled with a perverse
enjoyment of criminal activity.11
¶ 7 During the war, the Government was overtaken several times by intragovernmental factions.12 Taking full advantage of the regime changes, RUF forces
advanced on government forces, eventually gaining substantial control of the diamond
mines.13 The Government, in turn, engaged private security firms and the Nigerian-led
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (“ECOMOG”) to shield
against the RUF coup d’etat.14 Government forces were minimally successful in
containing RUF forces.15
¶ 8 In 1996, pro-government forces successfully conducted a multi-party election and
elected as president former U.N. official and leader of the Sierra Leone’s People’s Party,
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.16 Kabbah subsequently entered into the Abidjan peace agreement17
with the RUF in which the government granted amnesty to RUF combatants in exchange
for an abrupt cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization.18 The Abidjan Accord went
unenforced, however, and the atrocities continued.19
¶ 9 In 1997, the Government again underwent a regime change, being replaced this
time by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“ARFC”).20 Mayhem ultimately
erupted when ARFC endeavored to share command with the RUF, leading to near-

10

See James Traub, The Worst Place on Earth, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 2000, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/43.
11
See generally Diane Marie Amann, Message as Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L.
237, 238 (2000).
12
See Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra
Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 156 (2000).
13
Id. at 156.
14
See David Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, April 23, 1999, at http://sierraleone.org/pratt042399.html (noting that “ECOMOG” entered into the war in 1994 by sending troops to
defend the government against RUF attack); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming
Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 394 (noting that in
1995 the government turned to private security firms to defend, which was successful but very brutal).
15
See Pratt, supra note 14.
16
See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 157.
17
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone (RUF/SL), November 30, 1996, at http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
18
See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 157.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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anarchy in the country. Regional instability prompted the U.N. to intervene and reinstate
the Kabbah administration.21 The change did not alleviate the problem, however, since
RUF forces maintained control of half the country and continued to launch attacks on the
capital city of Freetown.22 By the time Government forces regained control of the capital
following the notorious 1999 raid by RUF forces, an estimated six-thousand innocent
civilians were left dead and thousands more mutilated and limbless.23
¶ 10 RUF forces—comprised of thirty percent juvenile soldiers—implemented a brutal
war operation referred to by RUF commanders as “Operation No Living Thing,” where
rebel forces ripped through Freetown, raping thousands of women, killing innocent
civilians, and destroying the capital city.24 This and numerous other brutal operations
conferred upon juvenile soldiers the reputation as the cruelest combatants of the war.25
¶ 11 Throughout the conflict, RUF forces utilized a terroristic approach stylistically
similar to that of their chief ally Charles Taylor of Liberia.26 This terror-based strategy
included abducting children from their homes, forcing boys to engage in war and girls to
perform sexual services, and raiding and killing entire villages.27 Thousands of innocent
Sierra Leoneans suffered amputation and mutilation at the hands of rebel forces.28 The
RUF’s most notorious act of terror was chopping off the hands of those said to have cast
votes in 1996 for pro-government candidate Ahmed Tejan Kabah.29 The Sierra Leonean
Government, in response, adopted similarly gruesome war tactics.30
¶ 12 During the conflict, an estimated five-thousand juvenile soldiers committed
widespread and systematic atrocities in defiance of international conventions.31 Large
numbers of children were coerced to participate in the war, often facing death for

21

See Fritz & Smith, supra note 14, at 396.
Id.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 393.
25
Id. The RUF conducted other operations called “Operation Burn House” which was a series of arson
attacks and “Operation Pay Yourself” which was a program of looting. See Matthew S. Barton, ECOWAS
and West African Security: The New Regionalism, 4 DEPAUL INT’L L.J. 79, 80 (2000).
26
Id. (noting that Taylor and his National Patriotic Front Party utilized gruesome war tactics when they
overran Liberia and executed President Samuel Doe).
27
Id.
28
See U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone, Feb. 25, 2000,
§ 1, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/.
29
See generally Norimitsu Onishi, In Looted Home In Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at A1
(noting atrocities committed by rebel forces). Interestingly, this was the same practice utilized by Belgian
colonizers who chopped off the hands of Congolese who resisted harsh plantation conditions. See
BARBARA KINGSOLVER, THE POISONWOOD BIBLE 144, 432 (1998).
30
See Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167, 177 (2001) (noting that the government also
recruited child soldiers and committed crimes against humanity and other unspeakable acts).
31
Zarifis, supra note 1, at 19. (noting child soldier’s violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II).
22
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noncompliance.32 Some juvenile soldiers, however, acted voluntarily, serving as
commanders and foot soldiers during executions and mutilations.33 These juvenile
soldiers earned a reputation throughout the region as fearless and blood-thirsty killers.34
B.

The Lome Peace Accord

¶ 13 In July 1999, U.S. diplomats brokered the Lome Peace Accord,35 which offered

amnesty to all combatants and endowed the RUF regime with inclusion in the new
government in exchange for disarmament and demobilization.36 The U.N. SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative caveated the accords, insisting that “international
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law” would not be protected by the amnesty proviso.37 The
Lome Accords established various victims’ and refugees’ programs, educational
institutions, a Human Rights Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(“TRC”), a National Election Commission, and a Constitutional Review Committee.38
Despite the expansive amnesty provision, Sierra Leonean citizens staunchly supported
the agreement, deeming the Accords a crucial stride towards peace and regional
stability.39 To implement the Accords, the U.N. pledged nearly six-thousand peacekeeping
troops to the region.40
¶ 14 Global optimism notwithstanding, trouble promptly ensued when RUF forces
refused to adhere to the Accords and continued its brutal attacks on civilians.41 RUF
forces failed to disarm and demobilize, and in May 2000, they took hostage five-hundred
U.N. peacekeepers.42 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in mid-2000 that “the
situation in Sierra Leone remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil
war.”43 In November 2000, Government and RUF forces attempted another cease-fire

32

See Jeana Webster, Note, Sierra Leone—Responding to the Crisis, Planning for the Future: The Role of
International Justice in the Quest for National and Global Security, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 731,
755 (2001).
33
Id. at 755; see The Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, paras. 31-38 (2000).
34
See Michael A. Corriero, The Involvement and Protection of Children in Truth and Justice Seeking
Processes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 337, 339 (2002).
35
Lome Accords, supra note 5.
36
Interestingly, the Lome Accords specifically granted RUF leader Foday Sankoh an absolute and free
pardon despite his reputation as one of the most gruesome violators of human rights. The accords also
named Sankoh as vice president of the new government and head of the diamond industry oversight board.
See id. at art. IX(1). For negative reactions to the amnesty provisions see Norimitsu Onishi, How U.S. Left
Sierra Leone Tangled in a Curious Web, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2000, at 6 (stating objections from Harold
Hongju Koh, assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights; David Scheffer, ambassador at large for war
crimes and; Julia Taft, assistant Secretary of State for refugees).
37
See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.
38
Lome Peace Accords, supra note 5.
39
See Amann, supra note 11, at 241.
40
See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999).
41
See Bruce Zagaris, U.N. Security Council Votes to Establish War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone, 16
INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 10 (2000).
42
See id.
43
See id.
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agreement by way of the Abaju agreement, which recommitted the parties to the Lome
Accords.44 This effort was again futile. War continued to rage.
¶ 15 The conflict ultimately ceased when the U.N., Britain, and the United States

dispatched to Sierra Leone the world’s largest peacekeeping mission.45 RUF leader
Sankoh was subsequently apprehended and has remained incarcerated in an undisclosed
area ever since.46 Sierra Leone is currently recuperating from complete destruction and
numerous efforts are underway to stabilize the country.
III.

Creation of the Special Court

¶ 16 Cognizant of the importance of regional stability, the U.N. and the Government
of Sierra Leone jointly established the Special Court.47 The Court is a hybrid judicial
system administered concurrently by the U.N. and the Sierra Leone Government.48 The
Court is composed of a trial chamber, an appellate chamber, the prosecutor’s office, and
the registry.49 The Court’s express purpose is to prosecute those “persons who bear the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law . . ..”50 The U.N. Secretary General has cautioned that the term “persons
who bear the greatest responsibility” does not limit the Court’s personal jurisdiction to
political and military leaders; it is meant to provide a prosecutorial strategy rather than an
element of the crime.51

44

Id. at 10.
See Douglas Farah, A Separate Peacekeeping: In Sierra Leone, Britain, U.N. Clash over Ultimate Aim,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000, at A42; Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.Doc. S/2002/857, para. 18 (stating that U.N. has committed 16,664 troops to
Sierra Leone).
46
See David Bamford, Foday Sankoh: Rebel Leader, BBC NEWS ONLINE (May 12, 2000), at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_737000/737268.stm.
47
This agreement is different from U.N. Security Council’s resolutions creating criminal tribunals for
prosecution of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda because the Special Court for Sierra
Leone is not vested with U.N. Charter Chapter VII powers which authorize the tribunal to obtain
jurisdiction over criminals that are outside the boundaries of the country. Additionally, the Court will be
funded “voluntarily” by U.N. member states as opposed to the tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda which are more stably funded by mandatory assessments. Unlike the ICTY, the Special Court
statute contains no termination date. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (“ICTY”);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Neighboring States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (“ICTR”).
48
See Michelle Sieff, War Criminals: Watch Out, WORLD TODAY (Feb. 1, 2001).
49
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 11.
50
Id. at art. 1(1).
51
Letter from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/40, p. 2-3 (Jan. 12, 2001).
45
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¶ 17 The Court is staffed with local and international judges and prosecutors.52 The

Chief Prosecutor, appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, is to make the final decision
on indictments.53 The Court adheres to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).54 The Court is located in Sierra
Leone55 and imprisonment is to take place in Sierra Leone, provided that the prisons meet
U.N. requirements, or in any third country that has signed an agreement with the ICTR or
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).56 U.N. member
states will voluntarily fund the Court.57
¶ 18 Article 10 of the Court statute provides that, “[a]n Amnesty granted to any person
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect to the crimes referred to in
articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”58 This clause
negates the broad amnesty granted combatants by way of Article XI of the Lome
Accords.59 Some commentators have argued that RUF’s material breach of the Lome
Accords renders the amnesty clause void;60 while others have argued that the amnesty
clause never protected war crimes and crimes against humanity.61 Whatever the case, the
statute does not recognize amnesty as a bar to prosecution.
¶ 19 Arguably the most complex and contentious issue facing the Court is the mode of
juvenile prosecution and the extent to which corporal punishment is proper. Punishment
of juvenile soldiers challenges both the rehabilitative assumptions of the TRC and the

52

See Seiff, supra note 48.
See Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children and the Quest for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone, 55 J.
INT’L AFF. (2001).
54
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 14(1).
55
See Seiff, supra note 48. A new building must be constructed as no existing location is secure or large
enough for the Court. The cost of building the Court and renovating a prison will be approximately $3.5
million. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, at paras. 60-62 (2000). Some commentators view the location of the
Court in Sierra Leone as being a great benefit to the culture, surrounding institutions and rule of law in the
region. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 53. Others argue that the location of a criminal tribunal is of
fundamental importance in allowing concerned victims to participate in the proceedings and seek redress.
See Adama Dieng, International Criminal Justice: From Paper to Practice—A Contribution from the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 688, 698-99 (2002).
56
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 22.
57
U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, at art. 8 (2000) (stating that the Court will be funded
by voluntary contributions). The Bush Administration has pledged $5 million to the Court. See Annan Will
Meet Cash Target for War Crimes Court, AFRICAN NEWS, July 25, 2001.
58
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 10. Article 2 relates to crimes against humanity; Article 3 covers
violations of the law of internal armed conflicts; and Article 4 deals with other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. Id.
59
Note also that the U.N. representative made a reservation to Article IX of the Lome Accords by noting
that war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are not protected by the amnesty clause. See
Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.
60
See, e.g., Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the
Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
347, 376 (2001).
61
See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.
53
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propriety of informal, nonpunitive, and relatively short-term social control.62 The debacle
poses complex questions of culpability, justice and impunity, as well as individual and
social healing. The Court statute mandates that child soldiers under the age of fifteen at
the time of the crime may not face prosecution.63 The Court statute does, however, permit
prosecution of juveniles over the age of fifteen.64 As Article 7 of the Court statute states:
The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who
was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime. Should any person who was, at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, between 15 and 18 years of age come
before the Court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a
sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the
desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration
into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in
accordance with international human rights standards, in
particular the rights of the child.65
¶ 20 The Sierra Leonean Government and its citizenry demand punishment of all

culpable parties, including juvenile soldiers.66 In sharp contrast, the Special Court statute
aspires to rehabilitate and reintegrate juvenile soldiers back into their communities.
Under the statute, a murderous combatant over the age of fifteen will face no real
punishment.67 Pursuant to Article 7(7) of the Court statute:
In the Trial of a juvenile offender the Court shall, in the disposition
of his or her case, order any of the following: care guidance and
supervision orders, community service orders, counseling, foster
care, correctional, educational and vocational training
programmes, approved schools, as appropriate, and programmes
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes
of child protection agencies.68
¶ 21 “Rehabilitative sentencing” via the TRC69 is the most readily available alternative

to corporal punishment.70 The TRC permits perpetrators to divulge to the Commission
62

See generally HART, supra note 6.
Letter from the Security-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/40 (January 12, 2001).
64
Id.
65
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7.
66
See Brutal Child Army Grows Up, BBC NEWS ONLINE (June 1, 2000), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_743000/743684.stm. In fact, in negotiations to
establish the Special Court, the Government of Sierra Leone demanded that suspects of all ages be subject
to prosecution and that convictions carry the possibility of capital punishment. See Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (2000).
67
See Letter from the Security-General, supra note 63; see also Amann, supra note 11, at 243.
68
Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7(7).
69
See Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000) (noting that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
will have a “major role to play” in sentencing child soldiers).
63
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their individual roles in the war without facing punishment.71 The TRC’s paramount
objective is to create a historical record of human rights violations committed during the
civil war.72 TRC proponents argue that it is the most effective accountability mechanism
for juveniles because “it allows the victim and perpetrator to heal emotionally and
psychologically.”73 The TRC will promulgate a final report discerning the causes, nature,
and extent of the human rights violations in Sierra Leone. The Government will
ultimately utilize these findings to help achieve improved insight into the causal factors
of the war so to prevent future conflicts.74
¶ 22 The post-war landscape presents to the Court an anomalous situation: The victims
demand severe punishment of the most culpable juvenile soldiers, while the Court statute
seeks to rehabilitate and reintegrate the violent juveniles back into the very communities
they once terrorized.75 In the absence of corporal punishment, this situation is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.

IV.

Current Proposals
A.

Creation of a Separate Juvenile Chamber

¶ 23 Recent proposals advocate the establishment of a separate juvenile division to

adjudicate juvenile matters.76 A separate juvenile division, the argument goes, would
provide a more efficient and fairer means by which to adjudicate juvenile matters and
maximize rehabilitative goals.77 Although U.N Secretary-General Annan recommended a
comparable children’s chamber, the Security Council expressly rejected the proposal,78
ostensibly regarding the idea as superfluous due to the Court’s current capability of
adequately addressing juvenile matters.79
1.

Problems with a Separate Juvenile Chamber

¶ 24 The major premise underlying a separate chamber is that juvenile soldiers should

be treated disparately from adult offenders because they are somehow less culpable and

70

Lome Accords, supra note 5. The TRC became law in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the first commission is
set up in Makeni, in Eastern Sierra Leone. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000,
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcacat2000.html.
71
Id.
72
Zarifis, supra note 1, at 20.
73
Id. at 21.
74
Id.
75
See Human Rights Watch: Children’s Rights Project, Children in Combat, 1996, at
http://www.hrw.org/press (noting that child soldiers were made to commit atrocities against their own
communities or families).
76
See, e.g., Corriero, supra note 34; Amann, supra note 30. Although I agree with the conclusion proffered
by Amann that adjudication of selected juvenile cases is appropriate, I disagree with the proposition that a
separate juvenile chamber is the correct means to that end. See discussion below in section III A(1).
77
See id.
78
Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, supra note 69.
79
See Amended Draft Statute, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000).
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more easily rehabilitated.80 Advocates argue that this disparate treatment strictly
adherences to fundamental principals of criminal justice.81 The ultimate goal of the
proposal, however, remains rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile soldiers into the
very communities that demands their punishment. One commentator hopes, perhaps overidealistically, that the Special Court will “lay a foundation for an effective system of
decriminalizing the conduct of child soldiers, and bring a sense of order, fairness and
dignity to those aggrieved.”82
¶ 25 The argument that ignoring the horrendous behavior of juvenile soldiers will

somehow bring “order, fairness and dignity”83 employs faulty logic and is pragmatically
troubling. How will decriminalizing systematic murder and rape bring any sense of
fairness, order, or dignity to the victims? The supposition counterintuitive, but is blatantly
counterfactual, ignoring Sierra Leoneans’ demand for punishment of all culpable
combatants. Although child soldiers are chronologically juveniles, their criminal conduct
is indistinguishable from that of their adult counterparts. In the absence of adequate
punishment, mayhem and social disorder will result, since “decriminalizing” criminal
behavior negates the deterrent and retributive hallmarks of criminal law, leaving the
victim no remedy other than self-help.
¶ 26 Furthermore, the current proposal’s presupposition that rehabilitation and

reintegration are attainable ends is erroneous. In Sierra Leonean society, where the
average male life span is thirty-seven, significant responsibility is assumed at an early
age.84 A fifteen-year-old Sierra Leonean combatant is effectively middle-aged.85 To seek
rehabilitation at that age in the absence of punishment would at best be extremely
difficult and often futile. Violent juvenile soldiers have forfeited the special place in life
they enjoyed before their crimes, so that society’s benign attitude toward minors does not
extend to embrace them.86 It is a truism that “victims of criminal acts suffer the same
injuries, regardless of the age of the perpetrators.”87 Without an adequate deterrent, the
statutory goal of rehabilitation of learned and experienced combatants is an unattainable
illusion.88 To be sure, the seminal report on child soldiers, conducted by child soldier
80
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expert Graca Machel for the U.N., concluded that “[i]t is difficult if not impossible, to
achieve reconciliation without justice.”89 Unpunished criminals produce justice for no
one; the victim’s grievances go unnoticed and unaddressed, and the criminal actor
remains unattached to community norms and unscathed by disapproval. As a pragmatic
matter, “[t]here can be no peace without justice, no justice without law, and no
meaningful law without a court to decide what is just and lawful under any given
circumstance.”90 A fundamental ingredient inherent in any notion of “justice” is
punishment for a wrong.
¶ 27 Deterrence and retribution must be the Court’s primary objectives to realistically
achieve stability in the country. Rehabilitation is a laudable goal, but given Sierra
Leoneans’ demand for punishment, it must exist as a secondary objective.91 In a country
where juvenile soldiers deem human life worthless, the efficacy of rehabilitation is
questionable, while the benefits of deterrence and retribution are more concrete. Criminal
prosecution as a response to the mass atrocities will bring a measure of justice and
recognition to the victims.92 Regional stability and the rule of law—the hallmark of
democracy—necessitate the imposition of penal sanctions that maximize the deterrent
and retributive goals of criminal law.
¶ 28 Policymakers must also remain aware of the message that the Court conveys to

Sierra Leoneans. That is, it is crucial that policymakers focus on the message that
civilians ultimately understand from the Court’s policy rather than what policymakers
intend.93 Inherent in a policy of strict adherence to rehabilitative principals is the message
that murderous criminals will go unpunished, and will instead be “counseled” on the
government’s dime and then placed back into the very communities they tortured.
Victim’s families will be left to grieve with nothing save unresolved loss, mourning, and
want for justice. The victim’s family—by human nature—will resort to their own forms
of retribution, usurping the Special Court’s role and taking justice into their own hands,
thus continuing the vicious cycle of violence in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the strictly
rehabilitative approach will teach future rebels that at the conclusion of war,
rehabilitative benefits will accrue and no real punishment will be rendered. Subtextually,
the current approach conveys a message that a new era of accountability is unrealistic,
and when criminal accountability appears unrealistic to society, there is little hope for

character). I take issue with this conclusion based on the author’s heavy reliance on the judge as a role
model and the judge’s essential place in making rehabilitation succeed. Deterrence and retribution are the
key elements in correcting the criminal behavior of a juvenile. The judge’s role is that of an unbiased third
party, rather than a “father figure.” Furthermore, the article seems to lose sight of the real victim and place
emphasis on the culpable juvenile as the victim—which is not the case.
89
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stability, especially in a region recovering from a decade-long civil war. As one learned
commentator has noted, “[p]unishing those responsible for the atrocities in Sierra Leone,
by conveying a concrete message of accountability, may begin to break that cycle of
violence.”94
2.

Infeasibility of a Separate Juvenile Chamber

¶ 29 The Court’s scarce resources significantly hamper the potential for a separate

juvenile’s chamber. The Court is funded through voluntarily contributions from U.N.
member-states.95 The U.N. originally planned to raise $32.2 million for the initial start-up
and first-year of the Court, and $84.4 million for the next two years.96 The United
Nations, however, endured significant problems raising the capital and consequently
drastically reduced the budget to $16.8 million for the first year for a total of $57 million
over the Court’s first three years.97 Juxtaposed to the ICTR and the ICTY, which
respectively receive $80 and $96 million annually, the Special Court is on a tight-rope
budget.98 As a practical matter, “it will be very difficult for this Court to look productive
given the [financial] constraints it will have operating in Sierra Leone.”99 In light of the
significant costs related to U.N. employees living in Freetown,100 additional U.N.
personnel to staff a separate juvenile court simply is not feasible. The costs of separate
trials in a separate court, which would be held to international standards, would quickly
deplete the Court’s minuscule budget.101
¶ 30 Moreover, prosecution of juveniles under the Court’s current structure would

produce similar results without the excessive cost. The Court statute already delineates
standards by which child combatants are to be adjudicated,102 obviating the need for a
separate chamber. A separate chamber would merely serve a semantically-oriented
purpose, allowing proponents to postulate that children are being treated “fairly” because
jurisdictional power is vested in a different court, where in fact the end-results would be
the same. To be sure, when punishing juveniles, the Special Court can only prosecute the
most culpable violators of human rights; inclusion of child combatants within the
jurisdictional province of the Court will not increase its prosecutorial scope. A separate
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chamber would thus cause severe inefficiencies, hamper judicial economy, and impede
justice in an area in dire need of swift and adequate justice.
B.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the Sole Punishment

¶ 31 Various non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) argue that the TRC is
sufficient “punishment” for juvenile soldiers because prosecution would weaken
rehabilitative efforts.103 The argument is based on the idea that prosecution stigmatizes
defendants and adversely affects rehabilitation and reintegration. Some NGO’s presume
that every juvenile offender was forced into warfare. From this they deduce that holding
juveniles accountable for their vicious crimes would endanger the efficacy of
rehabilitation.104 According to Human Rights Watch:

Although we believe that children should be accountable for their
offenses, in light of their inherent immaturity as well as the
subjection of many child combatants to forcible abduction,
brutalization and other forms of coercion, we recommend that the
Special Court’s limited resources would be far better used in
pursuit of justice for adult offenders, rather than children.105
¶ 32 The statement fails, however, to articulate why the Court’s limited resources
would be better utilized prosecuting adult combatants while granting absolute immunity
to juveniles. More importantly is the omission of any empirical evidence—or any other
form of evidence—that justifies complete immunity for all juvenile soldiers under the age
of eighteen.

1.

Problem with the TRC as the Sole Punishment

¶ 33 The Court’s scarce resources should indeed be utilized to prosecute the most

culpable parties, but it does not follow that a fortiori violent juveniles should go
unpunished. The Court is directed to “prosecute those persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
Law . . ..”106 This clause textually confines the Court’s prosecutorial scope, making it
rather contradictory and arbitrary to postulate that violent juveniles should be
categorically immune from prosecution because of their status as minors to assure that
only the most culpable parties are prosecuted.
¶ 34 Juvenile soldiers were among the most violent actors in the war, and certain

juvenile combatants voluntarily assumed key leadership roles.107 The unambiguous text of
the statute should be effectuated irrespective of the artificial adult/minor dichotomy.108
103
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One must recognize that “[t]he continuation of the artificial juvenile/adult
dichotomization has [historically] resulted in a disservice to the public safety.”109 It is the
proper role of the Court to determine who is “most responsible” for the mutilations,
rapes, and extra-judicial killings. If a juvenile soldier is one of the most culpable parties
then appropriate punishment is necessary.110
¶ 35 The TRC permits juveniles to disclose their violent crimes to the Commission

without facing any form of punishment.111 If rehabilitation is the main concern, one
should consider the rehabilitative theory of criminal law: Imprisonment benefits the
criminals themselves by reforming their characters so they are no longer motivated to
engage in crime.112 Concededly, the TRC plays a valuable role in documenting the
atrocities, but it is an idealistic fantasy to intimate that the Commission suffices as
punishment for violent criminals. Moreover, sufficient documentation of war crimes can
be accomplished through trial mechanisms.113
¶ 36 While one may justifiably seek emotional repair and rehabilitation for criminals
via the TRC, the Court’s paramount objectives must be deterrence and retribution. The
only juveniles potentially facing punishment are those who voluntarily and intentionally
committed war crimes.114 The true victims in this situation are not the murderers, but the
grieving families and innocent civilians on the receiving end of the crime. Encouraging
dangerous criminals to disclose their crimes without punishment will not prevent another
war; it will merely serve as an opportunity to “reintegrate” until the next coup d’etat
presents itself. The then-child soldier now becomes an experienced and undeterred leader
of a lawless faction.
¶ 37 More subtly, what happens when a violent juvenile soldier is “reintegrated” into

society and upon minimal provocation reverts to learned and unpunished war-like tactics?
This scenario is sure to come to fruition if undeterred criminals are merely interviewed
and released back into the very society they tortured. Will the criminal actor continue to
avoid punishment? Or is punishment permissible at this point? The answer must be that
punishment should occur at the time of the original crime to prevent subsequent crimes.
¶ 38 Admittedly, rehabilitation, when properly executed, negates some of the expected

draconian reactions of juvenile soldiers, but not all of the adverse affects of nonpunishment are alleviated. Withstanding complete rehabilitation, the fact still remains
that victims’ wrongs will not be righted absent putative sanctions vis-à-vis those
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responsible. The practical result of unredressed wrongs is regional instability as victims
seek vindication by any means. If the Court is unable to prosecute the most culpable
criminals, including juveniles, the goals sought by the Court—accountability, regional
stability, and the rule of law—will remain unattainable.
2.

Juvenile Punishment is Consistent with International Norms

¶ 39 As a basis for blanket immunity for juvenile soldiers, proponents postulate that

putative punishment of juveniles runs counter to international norms.115 If, however, one
looks at the enabling statute for the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—the epitome of
international norms—punishment of juvenile criminals for crimes against humanity,
genocide, and other horrific crimes is permissible.116 Moreover, many nation-states have
implemented adjudicatory procedures for juveniles charged with conduct that would be
criminal if committed by an adult.117 In determining punishment, Western nations have
for some time treated violent juveniles as adults.118 More compelling, however, is nonWestern acceptance of juvenile punishment.119 The fact is that prosecuting juvenile
soldiers for their gruesome war crimes is in conformity with international norms and
necessitated by the delicate post-war situation in Sierra Leone.
V.

The Appropriate Solution

¶ 40 The Court must promote the integrity of the criminal law and assure
accountability. To this end, the most effective solution is to treat juvenile soldiers (at least
fifteen years old) similar to their adult counterparts upon a finding that they voluntarily
joined a warring faction and voluntarily committed heinous crimes. The gravamen of the
two-prong requirement is that the soldier possessed the requisite mens rea to join a
warring faction and the mens rea to commit the crime. This high standard of criminal
liability normatively corresponds with international criminal law jurisprudence, which
requires one to possess an undiminished capacity to exercise free will in choosing
between right and wrong.120 The second essential element is the age constraint: The child
soldier must have been at least fifteen years old at the time of the crime’s commission.121
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Although “line-drawing” with regard to age and punishment is intrinsically arbitrary, it is
necessary to effectuate the rule of law.122 Fifteen years of age is the minimum age under
the current Court statute for prosecution123 and it was until recently the minimum age for
recruitment into armies pursuant to the most widely ratified international convention.124
Furthermore, fifteen years of age has been deemed an appropriate age for prosecution by
Western and non-Western nations alike.125
A.

The Proper Framework
[O]ne of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of
its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the
task is through criminal laws against murder.126

¶ 41 The Special Court’s primary purpose is to punish those most responsible for
grave human rights violations.127 The most culpable parties for the summary executions,
rapes, mutilations, and other horrific crimes must face severe punishment for their
actions.
¶ 42 While great significance should not be placed on rehabilitation and reintegration
absent a punitive response, it is nonetheless a worthwhile ancillary goal. Despite
skepticism surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitation and reintegration without
“justice,”128 it nonetheless may be an attainable goal where the juvenile’s culpability is
minimal. Furthermore, given the Court’s limited resources, rehabilitative measures will
have to suffice as “punishment” for minimally culpable parties. Paramount attention and
resources must be expended prosecuting the most culpable parties.129
¶ 43 To that end, proposed below is a procedural design for an ad hoc criminal
tribunal in Sierra Leone that maximizes judicial economy and efficacy. The adjudicatory
process consists of an initial fact-finding phase conducted by the prosecutor, followed by
a trial when appropriate, and concludes with a sentencing phase, at which time the Court
considers mitigating factors including age and immaturity. The adjudicatory process is
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the same for both adult and juvenile offenders, although the Court will formulate
additional inquiries in juvenile cases. The macro-level focal point is on regional
stabilization and the establishment of the rule of law by way of deterrence and
retribution. To this end, the Special Court should follow the lead of the ICTY and impose
“imprisonment to protect society from the hostile, predatory conduct of the guilty
accused.”130
1.

The Fact-Finding Phase

¶ 44 The adjudicatory process for adult and juvenile soldiers should initially consist of

a thorough fact-finding phase comprised of a preliminary investigation, legal analysis of
the discovered facts, and a determination of prosecutorial success. The prosecutor should
consider the culpability of the offender to determine whether punishment is warranted.
The prosecutor must meticulously explore the nature of the crime and the suspected
perpetrator to settle on the correct response. At the forefront of the prosecutorial decisionmaking process must be the Court’s express statutory purpose of prosecuting only the
most culpable combatants.131 This statutory limit necessarily fixes the prosecutor’s outerboundary in the fact-finding phase and serves to check unfettered discretion.132 The
prosecutor should consider mitigating factors established by the Court.133 Only if there is
clear and convincing admissible evidence to prove that the combatant voluntarily
participated in the conflict should the investigative phase proceed.
¶ 45 Despite the pragmatic attractiveness of this approach, some commentators have

argued that the judge in the case should serve as the prosecutorial decision-maker.134 This
proposal, however, is extremely problematic in terms of procedural and substantive due
process. To be sure, if a judge is permitted to evaluate a crime and determine the validity
of the charge prior to hearing the case, the judge is no longer an unbiased adjudicator; the
judge will have inevitably made a premature determination that the defendant is (or is
not) culpable to some degree and should (or should not) face prosecution. Inherent in the
prosecutorial decision-making process is the determination that the defendant is
(in)sufficiently guilty to even face trial. The intermingling of the judicial and
prosecutorial roles in the fact-finding phase permits the judge to take undue consideration
of inadmissible evidence at trial. This approach directly contradicts rudimentary
principals of fairness and due process—essential elements of any fair trial.135 The
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prosecutor must retain broad prosecutorial discretion pursuant to the current Court
statute.136 Prosecutorial decision-making allows a fair determination of the legal
sufficiency of a charge while liberating the judge from pretrial bias.137
¶ 46 When the accused is a juvenile, the prosecutor should first determine the manner
in which the combatant became involved in the warring faction, namely whether
association was voluntary or involuntary. This inquiry is critical since many juveniles
were conscripted into battle.138 Cases involving conscription should not be prosecuted due
to the actor’s diminished capacity to exercise free will. Prosecution in these cases would
not effectuate the statutory purpose.
¶ 47 Concededly, a determination of the voluntary nature of inculcation may be
complicated in situations where child soldiers joined a faction out of economic
desperation.139 Illustrative of this complexity are the remarks of an eight-year-old orphan
who fought in Sierra Leone and Liberia:

There, there was tribal war. There, street children like me became
child soldiers . . .. Small soldiers had it all. They had
Kalashnikovs. Kalashnikovs, those are rifles invented by a Russian
that shoot without stopping. With Kalashnikovs, child soldiers had
it all. They had money, even American dollars. They had shoes,
military stripes, radios, caps, and even cars, called 4 by 4’s. I
cried, ‘Walahe! Walahe!’ I wanted to go to Liberia. Quickly.140
¶ 48 The determination of volition must be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than a
through a bright-line rule effectively allowing juveniles to avoid prosecution upon
concocting a claim of “constructive coercion” via impoverishment. The prosecutor
should consider the extent of poverty suffered and the causal connection between poverty
and association with the faction. Prima facie the factual undertaking seems daunting, but
recall that only those parties most responsible for the atrocities will be prosecuted, which
necessarily limits the scope of inquiry.141 Although contemporary thought dictates that the
intentional taking of a life without justification requires a punitive response when the
offender has even minimal appreciation for the nature of her acts and their
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consequences,142 this is unachievable given the Court’s limited scope and resources.143 As
a protection to defendants, a determination of volition by the prosecutor is not a per se
preclusion from raising the issue at trial as an affirmative defense.
¶ 49 If the juvenile was abducted and forced to engage in battle, culpability is minimal
and the investigation should cease. If, however, clear and convincing evidence indicates
that the juvenile voluntarily joined the faction—uninfluenced by coercive measures—the
investigative phase should continue.
¶ 50 The prosecutor’s next consideration is the volitional nature of the commission of
the alleged crime. Investigation should halt when a child voluntarily joined a faction but
was forced to commit a crime, since the actor lacked the requisite mens rea. Although the
combatant is culpable of the actus reus of joining the faction, culpability is minimal
because this actus reus was coerced.144
¶ 51 If the combatant intentionally committed the crime, the prosecutor should
conduct a severity determination. If the alleged crime is of overall de minimus
significance and prosecution would not further the Court’s statutory purpose,145 the
investigation should cease. Determinative factors may include: the gravity and severity of
the crime, the effects of the crime on civilians, the violent nature of the crime, and the
extent to which the crime violated international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law. The excuse that “some young people failed to exercise their evolving capacity to
determine right from wrong in Sierra Leone” 146 should not preclude prosecution when
the above-mentioned factors exist. If a thorough investigation reveals that a juvenile
bears the greatest responsibility and that all acts were committed voluntarily, the Court
should conduct a full trial.

2.

The Trial Phase

¶ 52 The trial should resolve the factual determinations made during the investigative

phase. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”147 The soldier should receive the assistance of competent counsel throughout the
proceedings.148 The burden of proof and production remains on the prosecution except
where the defendant is attempting to prove an affirmative defense, such as coercive
indoctrination or insanity. The Rules of Evidence adopted from the ICTR will govern the
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admissibility of evidence.149 When the defendant is a juvenile, the Court must follow the
prescribed statutory standards and treat all child soldiers “with dignity and a sense of
worth . . . in accordance with international human rights standards . . ..”150 The
adjudicatory phase should “ensure that the most recalcitrant and feared young offenders,
those perhaps least likely to seek programmatic and therapeutic support, are brought into
a credible system of justice . . .”151 and tried before an impartial tribunal. The Court must
“examine each offender’s personal responsibility for the harm done, not only the degree
of harm to the victims.”152
¶ 53 Upon a finding of guilt, the adjudicatory process should continue to the
sentencing phase. When a defendant is found not guilty, the Court should issue a
memorandum opinion stating that the defendant underwent a full and fair trial and was
found not guilty. The opinion could be published in a local paper to shred the clouds of
public doubt and make reintegration more plausible.

3.

Sentencing Phase

¶ 54 The sentencing phase embodied in the current Court statute is the most
noteworthy flaw in the Court’s institutional design. Currently, it is impermissible to
imprison a guilty juvenile between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.153 A culpable juvenile
may only be assigned to a rehabilitative mechanism—typically the TRC—where the only
“punishment” rendered is voluntary disclosure of the crimes.154 Upon “rehabilitative
punishment” the convicted criminal is placed back into the very community she
terrorized and the very community that demands her punishment.155
¶ 55 In determining the proper sentence, deterrence should guide the Court. The Court
must send a message through the prospect of imprisonment that violent behavior in
contravention of international social norms156 will be adequately punished. Imprisonment
will signal to potential murderers that society will assuredly respond—and harshly so—to
their actions.157
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¶ 56 The deterrent effect of imprisonment will benefit all Sierra Leonean citizens.
Imprisonment will specifically deter the perpetrator from taking up arms against her
fellow citizens and convey the message that violence is an unacceptable means of dispute
resolution. As the Machel Report stated, “[u]nless those at every level of political and
military command fear that they will be held accountable for crimes and subject to
prosecution, there is little prospect of restraining their behaviour . . ..”158 Furthermore, the
stigma of indictment attached to juvenile combatants will incapacitate them by
discrediting their leadership potential and undermining their future political influence.159
Imprisonment will also deter Sierra Leoneans from perpetrating crimes. Such punishment
disincentivizes citizens from criminal behavior as a means of ameliorating grievances.
¶ 57 Retributive goals should supply the second guiding principal for the Court. As
the United States Supreme Court has stated:

[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders
the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.160
¶ 58 The establishment of social stability necessitates the need for citizens to feel that
true justice was served.161 The only civilized alternative to victims’ desire for revenge is
official rendering of justice.162 It is a truism that adequate “[p]unishment must be one of
the appropriate responses of any legal authority . . .”163 especially for a legal authority
seeking to establish governmental legitimacy and the rule of law.
¶ 59 Victims are particularly unlikely to believe that “justice” was fulfilled when

convicted killers are “sentenced” to merely disclose the killings and subsequently
released. The notion underlying retribution is that collective societal retribution vis-à-vis
combatants will render the victims less likely to pursue self-help measures that would in
and of themselves violate international humanitarian law.164 In the absence of official
158
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retributivism, regional stability will remain an unattainable fiction. If rehabilitative
measures are the only “punishment” rendered then retributive goals cannot be met.165
¶ 60 The judge must have broad discretion in determining the appropriate punishment

of juveniles. To minimize the risk that imprisonment will be imposed on a capriciously
selected group, however, generalized standards should be formulated to focus the judge
on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.166 The judge should
consider the gravity of the crime, the manner in which it was committed, mitigating
circumstances such as age and immaturity, the minor’s attitude toward society and
respect for the rule of law, and the prospect for a future constructive life in light of the
circumstances.167
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¶ 61 The Court should recognize as mitigating factors age and immaturity.168

Acknowledgement of age and immaturity as mitigating factors is quite distinct from
granting juveniles blanket immunity. Under the mitigating-factor regime, one’s prison
term is discounted by age and immaturity. The most conceptually solid approach to
mitigation is what criminal law scholars have termed the “discounting strategy.”169 The
initial inquiry of the discounting approach is the punishment of an adult offender for the
same crime.170 The punishment of the hypothetical adult offender is then “discounted” by
a predetermined percentage reduction for the youthful offender.171 In a nutshell, the
discounting strategy operates as follows:
If adult burglars with particular criminal histories typically get
four years of penal confinement at sentencing, the way to calculate
the appropriate penalty for a fifteen-year-old burglar is to
determine a discount from the secure confinement sentence of an
adult that is appropriate for fifteen-year-olds and then apply it. If,
on average, conditions of diminished responsibility for fifteenyear-olds should produce a fifty-percent punishment reduction, one
calculates the punishment of the fifteen-year-old by multiplying the
adult sentence times 1.0 minus the discount, or in this case: 4 years
x (1.0-.5)= 2 years. 172
¶ 62 Discounting is directly dependent on the adult penalty for the type of punishment

and its duration.173 One method of calculation is to discount certain types of crimes by
predetermined percentages, e.g., all juvenile murderers are entitled to a thirty percent
punishment reduction. Alternatively, a general rule could require all sentences rendered
upon juvenile combatants be discounted by “x” percent irrespective of the crime. The
discounting approach is attractive because the greatest benefits are reaped by the
youngest offenders. For example:
A fourteen-year-old offender would receive . . . 25 percent of the
adult penalty; a sixteen-year-old defendant, 50 percent; and an
eighteen-year-old, the adult penalty, as is presently the case. The
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“deeper discounts” for younger offenders correspond to the
developmental continuum of responsibility.174
The traditional discounting approach uses the same age-based discounts for all categories
of offenses and liability.175
¶ 63 In recognition of normative international standards, juveniles should not face the

death penalty.176 Although the Government of Sierra Leone initially demanded the death
penalty for juveniles,177 the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions states that
“[t]he death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of
eighteen years at the time of the offense.”178 Western nations have imposed a somewhat
similar ban on the juvenile death penalty.179 Without squarely addressing the issue, suffice
it to say that external justifications (if nothing else) necessitate rejection of the death
penalty in juvenile cases. The Special Court should adhere to international norms
regarding juvenile death penalty policy in order to maintain international and domestic
legitimacy. Great divergence from international norms would harvest unnecessary
criticism for the Court.
B.

Benefits of the Proposed Adjudicatory Framework
1.

Economic and Judicial Efficiency

¶ 64 The adjudicatory framework proposed in this article is more economically

efficient than the creation of a separate child’s court. The Special Court’s restricted
resources must be utilized for the solitary purpose of prosecuting those who bear the
greatest responsibility, not on additional personnel and administrative expenditures that
would flow from a separate child’s chamber. There is no legitimate rationale for creating
a separate chamber which would inevitably produce identical results.180 Instead of
creating a children’s court antithetical to the Court’s purpose, the TRC should remain the
primary forum for soldiers not among those most responsible for the atrocities.
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Functionally, the TRC renders the proposed child’s court inapposite and would be a
complete misuse of very limited funds.181
¶ 65 Furthermore, empowering the Court to imprison the most culpable juveniles will

avoid expenditures on rehabilitative measures via a child’s court, which are already
provided for by the TRC. With the establishment of the TRC, there is no acceptable
rationale for using the Court’s resources to adjudicate all juvenile case when the statute
dictates that “rehabilitative measures” must be rendered upon guilty juveniles regardless
of the crime.182 By allowing the Court to imprison the most culpable combatants and using
the TRC to “rehabilitate” the less culpable, the Court’s limited resources can be used for
essential investigations and adequate fact-finding procedures. These available resources
will help assure prosecution of only the most culpable combatants and provide a fair and
thorough trial.
2.

Comparative Institutional Advantage

¶ 66 The Special Court is the best-equipped institution to address the most violent
juvenile soldiers. The proposed institutional design gives the Court a comparative
advantage over other alternatives, with legally trained professionals and staff to
determine the culpability of an individual on a case-by-case basis and determine proper
punishment.
¶ 67 The Special Court is institutionally designed to treat all parties—both victims and

perpetrators—fairly and justly. Each soldier brought before the Court is afforded
fundamental due process rights including the opportunity to a have full, fair, and
unbiased trial. A fair trial by a competent court gives Sierra Leoneans assurance that
justice was rendered. Victims and defendants can trust that the Court has rendered fair
results. Victim belief that adjudication is fair is essential to regional stability and the rule
of law. In the absence of judicially-administered punishment, mayhem and conflict will
prevail and a true democracy will remain impossibility.
¶ 68 Arbitrarily assigning violent juveniles to rehabilitative programs—such as the

TRC—provides fairness and justice to no one. Under the current paradigm, the victims
definitively know that a convicted juvenile will not receive the deserved punishment.183
Where the Special Court does not defer to the citizen’s basic demands for fairness and
justice, the entire legal system will fail.
¶ 69 The current regime is also unfair to juvenile perpetrators who are arbitrarily

assigned to rehabilitative programs. Child combatants are entitled to a full and fair trial.
It is fundamentally unfair to force a juvenile to come before the TRC and appear guilty in
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the public’s eyes when in-fact she may not be. The proposed solution permits a tribunal
to determine guilt and the proper sentence if required, rather than following an arbitrarily
predetermined sanction, such as is the case with the TRC. A sentencing restriction is
inherently unfair to the soldier in whose interest it may in be to develop a customized
sentence which encompasses multi-faceted punishment mechanisms. All parties suffer
where justice is unnecessarily restricted.
3.

Establishment of the Rule of Law

There can be no peace without justice, no justice without law, and
no meaningful law without a court to decide what is just and lawful
under any given circumstance. The process of codification,
adjudication and enforcement is as vital to a tranquil international
community as it is to any independent national state.184
¶ 70 The most fundamental element of a stable and prosperous nation is the rule of

law. The essential premise underlying the rule of law is that “respect for the rule of law
will create respect for legal processes and an internal moral barrier against conduct that
legal institutions have condemned.”185 Establishing respect for the law in Sierra Leone is
the quintessential step to halting violence and fostering stability. Juvenile offender cases
are “difficult but important tests of the general principals that are supposed to be in play
throughout the [legal] system.”186 The Special Court must, therefore, remain cognizant of
the macro-level concerns such as stability and the rule of law in adjudicating juvenile
soldier matters.
¶ 71 Imprisoning culpable juvenile combatants will solidify the role of the legal
system in Sierra Leone and broadcast the message that the law must be followed or
punitive sanctions will be imposed. Punishment encompassing imprisonment must be one
of the appropriate responses of any legal authority responsible for addressing juvenile
crimes.187
¶ 72 Prosecution of juvenile soldiers will also develop Sierra Leonean juvenile law

jurisprudence.188 Domestic courts can learn much from the Special Court and implement
progressive domestic changes. Sierra Leonean substantive law will evolve and develop as
it is utilized in Special Court prosecutions.189
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¶ 73 Prosecution and sufficient punishment will also establish the moral background
upon which future generations will be taught right from wrong.190 Because positive
ingrained societal norms are lacking in Sierra Leone, the Special Court will set a new
moral code for future generations. It is very important in sentencing that the Court
considers the “moral-education message to the present and the next generation of children
in Sierra Leone.”191
¶ 74 Furthermore, a legitimate legal system in Sierra Leone will directly affect the
operation of a market economy.192 By establishing a legal system, market participants are
more likely to invest in the region because they can enlist the help of the law in settling
grievances.193 A solid legal system will help legitimize the diamond trade in Sierra Leone
and provide investors incentive to further explore the region. Market growth in Sierra
Leone will correspondingly provide citizens with jobs, making criminal behavior less
attractive and assuring an improved quality of life. Regional stability necessarily follows
from a legitimate and vibrant market economy.

VI.

Conclusion

¶ 75 Sierra Leone is currently juggling myriad grim and perplexing problems of global
significance. The establishment of the Special Court is a momentous step towards
reconciliation and regional stability, but officials must proceed cautiously, as the Court
can either stabilize the region and the rule of law or it can further aggrieve the victims.
Pursuant to its statutory directive to prosecute the most culpable criminals, the Court
must utilize all available punitive mechanisms to seek truth-based justice and construct
broad-based respect for the rule of law.
¶ 76 In a war involving scores of violent juvenile combatants, it is critical to the future

of Sierra Leone that the Court is vested with jurisdictional authority to fully adjudicate
these matters. The strict-rehabilitative approach is an insufficient response to the complex
problems facing Sierra Leone.
¶ 77 The Court’s primary focus in determining punishments must be both on the micro
and societal impacts of the punishment, including the benefits of deterrence, retribution,
regional stability, and the rule of law. Imprisoning the most culpable juveniles serves the
macro-goals most beneficial to Sierra Leone. In the absence of regional stability, Sierra
Leone will remain in its decade-long state of mayhem—the ultimate problem the Special
Court is designed to remedy.
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¶ 78 The organizational framework for the Special Court offered in this article will
allow Sierra Leone to emerge from the decade-long conflict holding the key elements to a
prosperous and stable nation. The U.N. and the Sierra Leonean Government must,
however, proceed with caution in these volatile times; it must find the correct balance
between effectuating its citizens’ demands and legitimizing the region’s institutional
bodies.
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